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The European Commission, in its well-known 2001 Green Paper on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, described CSR as a “concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis.” This definition perfectly fits the CSR context at the very 
beginning of the 21st century, when a flow of companies’ efforts in CSR was driven by a 
renewed awareness of responsibility towards society and the environment, which remained 
unfulfilled by governmental institutions (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2017).  
However, since 2011 the Commission has started developing a different conceptualization and 
application of CSR, including also mandatory aspects. The great novelty introduced in 2011 
consists in the legitimation of the role of public authorities in supporting CSR “through a smart 
mix of voluntary policy measures and, where necessary, complementary regulation” (European 
Commission, 2011). Such a great change in the European context proves that CSR is a concept 
in continuous evolution, implying that “its content evolves and shifts over time depending on 
changes in the degree of risk, regulation, reputational challenge, and standards of desirable 
behavior” (Baxi, 2005). 
The objective of my work is to investigate one specific mandatory CSR aspect introduced by 
the European Commission, together with the European Parliament, in its renewed 2011/14 CSR 
strategy. The mandatory CSR disclosure has been introduced with the EU Directive 95, 
addressing a number of public-interest entities which exceed the threshold of 500 employees. 
The targeted companies have to publish CSR-related information on a consolidated non-
financial statement starting from fiscal year 2018.  
Previous literature on the imposition of CSR disclosure shows different advantages and 
disadvantages for firms complying with such regulation and, consequently, increasing their 
CSR disclosure. Increasing data availability to the public can signal their commitment to 
transparency and their willingness to be socially responsible. In this regard, past studies 
document that firms with higher ESG disclosure enjoy benefits in terms of brand and reputation 
or access to finance (e.g. Bhattacharya and Luo, 2006; Cheng et al., 2014). Richardson and 
Welker (2001) have also provided evidence that socially aware investors are willing to pay a 
premium for the securities of socially responsible firms. On the other side, Chen, Hung and 
Wang have found a negative economically significant shock for firms subject to mandatory 
CSR reporting, with a profitability deterioration in terms of ROA and ROE.  
However, only few researchers have already questioned whether CSR disclosure mandates have 
real positive effects on the firm CSR performance. Although such mandate does not require any 
changes in firm behavior, Chen, Hung and Wang (2018) developed the hypothesis that 
  Elisa Conflitti 
5 
 
mandatory disclosure impacts a firm’s activities because the increased transparency can make 
it easier for governments and interest groups to pressure firms to engage in more CSR activities. 
Confirming this hypothesis, they found that the 2008 Chinese CSR disclosure regulation had a 
diminishing effect in industrial wastewater and SO2 emission, which together represent a 
measure for the environmental performance of firms subject to the mandate. 
The European CSR regulatory framework has represented an interesting ground to raise my 
research question on whether the EU CSR disclosure mandate has had a positive impact on 
firms’ CSR performance. I answered this research question through an OLS regression model, 
which was performed over a 3 year time frame, with a sample of firms composing the S&P 
Europe 350 Index. Their ESG performance is measured by different Thomson Reuters ESG 
scores, while the application of Directive 2014/95/EU is represented by an explaining dummy 
variable, which assumes a value equal to 1 in the only one year of regulatory application 2018.  
The thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter 1 analyzes the main cases of CSR-related regulations introduced by the governments 
of various worldwide countries. As these cases focus on regulations mandating different aspects 
of CSR in different social backgrounds, both positive and negative aspects associated with the 
imposition of CSR emerge in chapter 1. What mostly emerges is that CSR is moving beyond 
the voluntary aspect which was still predominant few years ago. In more recent years, indeed, 
growing social (e.g., poverty, deteriorating social equality, and corruption) and environmental 
(e.g., climate change, water usage, and waste) challenges have generated renewed pressures on 
companies by investors, shareholders and a wide range of stakeholders to adopt a more 
systematic approach towards risk management and sustainability reporting. 
Companies are increasingly expected to disclose how they are utilizing, developing (or 
depleting) and, more generally, affecting human capital, natural resources and society at large 
(Ioannou and Serafeim, 2017). Therefore, mandatory CSR disclosure may contribute to 
mitigate information asymmetry between internal and external stakeholders, thanks to an 
improvement in the non-financial reporting quality.  
The last paragraph of chapter 1 introduces the European CSR context and provides a detailed 
explanation of the European Directive, which brings to formulate my research question after a 
review of the relevant related literature. 
In the second chapter I provide an answer to my research question through multiple OLS 
regression models, where I use an explaining dummy variable to represent the application of 
Directive 2014/95/EU in each of the observation years 2016 to 2018. Thomson Reuters ESG 
Combined Score and some of its score components are regressed on the dummy variable eudir 
and other control variables of different nature.  
6 
 
As the study results don’t reflect my initial positive expectations, I finally provide some 
possible explanations to the outcome, also showing the limitations of my regression model. 
 
1. Mandatory vs Voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility: Initiatives and Related 
Literature. 
 
1.1 Literature review: research methods and inclusion criteria. 
Two specific inclusion criteria have been used to select the articles taken into consideration for 
this work. The first criterion is based on the source: the articles have been selected from reliable 
sources which are EBSCO and Scopus, both belonging to “Sistema Bibliotecario di Ateneo” of  
“Università degli Studi di Padova”, whose other international Economics databases have also 
been used to look for relevant literature. Google Scholar has been used as a supplementary 
source of articles because the articles regarding some CSR-related topics are more consistently 
indexed on this search engine than on the previously cited sources.  
The second criterion is based on articles rating: each article rating has been double-checked on 
Budget Integrato Ricerca Dipartimentale (BIRD) 2018, published by “Dipartimento di Scienze 
Economiche e Aziendali M. Fanno”, and Academic Journal Guide (AJG) 2018 published by 
“Chartered Association of Business Schools”. Specifically, the articles included have at least a 
ranking of B, on a range from A to E, according to BIRD and/or at least a ranking of 3 according 
to AJG, on a range from 4* to 0.  
All the articles not complying with both the aforementioned criteria were excluded from this 
study. 
At the beginning of the preparatory works, the articles have been found through a combination 
of generic key words, such as “corporate sustainability CSR”. As a thesis idea started taking a 
clearer shape, the key words employed changed to catch different CSR aspects which have been 
adopted in a voluntary as well as a mandatory form. Thus, “voluntary mandatory CSR” words 
have been used first in the research of interesting cases of CSR regulations enacted all over the 
world, and in a second moment more articles regarding a specific country CSR regulation have 
been looked for through words combinations such as “mandatory CSR India” or “mandatory 
CSR disclosure China”. At last, the literature research was all led towards the European 
Directive, therefore some related words have been mixed together in various ways, for example 
“CSR directive Europe”, “Directive 2014/95/EU” or simply “CSR Europe”. However, as few 
valid articles were available for this last topic, the sources of information mostly used consisted 
in different pages of the European Union official website. 
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1.2 Voluntary and Mandatory CSR Disclosure.  
Around the world, the number of companies that have developed governance processes to 
measure, analyse and communicate sustainability efforts has dramatically increased in the last 
few years. This trend only partly manifests because of voluntary actions by individual 
companies, while in many cases it is the result of a proliferation of reporting regulations aiming 
to incentivize companies to improve their environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
performance (Gatti et al., 2018).  
Firms might increase disclosure as a response to the regulation and/or the fear of being found 
not compliant, or because they might perceive benefits generated through compliance. The 
signalling theory suggests that firms whose goal is to signal that they are “good corporate 
citizens” will further increase disclosure, assuming that competitors will also be forced to 
increase their own disclosure because of the regulation (Verrecchia, 2001). Similarly, if 
disclosure regulations raise the perceived importance of ESG issues in society, firms could 
increase data availability to signal their commitment to transparency, their willingness to be 
responsible and accountable, and to conform to societal norms and expectations. In fact, past 
studies document that firms with higher ESG disclosure enjoy benefits in terms of brand and 
reputation or access to finance (e.g. Bhattacharya and Luo, 2006; Cheng et al., 2014). 
However it’s reasonable to expect that not all the firms will increase their ESG disclosure after 
a regulation comes into force, for three main reasons: first, many sustainability disclosure 
regulations contain a “comply or explain” provision (Gatti et al., 2018; Ackers and Eccles, 
2015); second, in contrast to financial reporting, it is not clear what the potential sanctions 
resulting from non-disclosure would be (Ackers and Eccles, 2015). The third and most 
substantial reason is that, as a rich literature on reporting incentives shows (i.e. Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2017), mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations can inflict various types of 
economic losses on the shareholders of the companies subject to the mandate; for example firms 
with superior sustainability disclosure will have to exert greater efforts and possibly incur 
higher costs to distinguish themselves from the rest of the firms in the period following the 
regulation.  
On the other hand, multiple studies have found that CSR activities, if voluntarily disclosed, 
provide a number of benefits to a firm’s stakeholders, including increased employee morale, a 
better firm reputation, and more harmonious growth (i.e. Edmans, 2012; Servaes and Tamayo, 
2013). Anecdotal evidence also indicates that firms’ reputation and long-term sales can suffer 
because of poor CSR performance (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). A well-known example is Nike, 
which struggled for years and invested a great amount of financial resources and effort to regain 
its reputation after the 1997 child labor scandal. 
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Besides the reputation improvement, other incentives exist for a firm to voluntarily disclose its 
CSR activities. Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang and Yang (2011) examined previous literature, finding out 
that a company’s enhanced financial disclosure relates to a decrease in its cost of capital through 
mechanisms that equally apply to non-financial disclosure. Among these major mechanisms we 
can include the increase in the investors’ awareness of a firm’s existence and the enlargement 
of its investor base (Merton, 1987), together with a reduced information asymmetry among 
investors or between managers and investors, equally giving as a result a decrease in the cost 
of equity (Lambert et al., 2007).  
In the aforementioned study (Dhaliwal et al., 2011), 294 US firms were analysed, mainly all 
firms in the S&P 500 and Domini 400 Social SM Index, that voluntarily issued a total of 1190 
standalone CSR reports between 1993 and 2007.   
The Hypothesis that CSR disclosure leads to a lower cost of equity capital was tested through 
a regression model, with Cost of Capital variation as the dependent variable and CSR 
Disclosure as the explaining one. Previously, another regression model was created where a 
group of firms voluntarily initiating CSR disclosure was compared with a non-initiating group. 
The results show that, consistent with the theory on voluntary disclosure, firms voluntarily 
publishing standalone CSR reports tend to have superior CSR performance relative to their 
industry peers. The control variables also prove that firms initiating CSR disclosure are 
significantly larger (higher market value of common equity), more profitable (higher ROA) and 
have a higher degree of leverage than non-initiators. The 2011 study continues by investigating 
on some of the underlying mechanisms through which voluntary CSR disclosure lowers the 
cost of equity capital. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) found that initiating firms with CSR performance 
superior to that of their industry peers enjoy a reduction in the cost of equity capital as they 
attract dedicated institutional investors and analyst coverage, and these analysts achieve lower 
absolute forecast errors and dispersion following such disclosure. 
Such mechanisms, that make non-financial disclosures affect firms’ financial performance, are 
similar to those activated by non-financial disclosure. Other than this type of mechanisms, 
however, CSR practices have additional possible channels to positively affect firms’ financial 
performance. For instance, socially aware investors are willing to pay a premium for the 
securities of socially responsible firms (Richardson and Welker, 2001). Perhaps more 
importantly, some CSR projects have direct implications for positive cash flow even in the near 
future. For example, practices related to protecting the environment and improving employee 
welfare can reduce potential litigation and pollution cleaning costs, boost employee morale  
and, thereby, the production efficiency (Dhaliwal et al., 2011).  
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All the arguments above are based on the assumption of voluntary CSR policies, which have 
for sure multiple positive aspects, but they have also received various criticisms. Among the 
main ones we can consider the promotion of free-riding behaviour (O’Neill, 2007), the 
impossibility of sanctioning transgressors (Cominetti and Seele, 2016) and the problems related 
to the level of transparency and credibility of voluntary CSR reports (Lock and Seele, 2016). 
On the contrary, a mandatory system may facilitate the establishment of regulated and 
comparable CSR indicators that finally benefit the whole nation (Horrigan, 2007).  
However, the opinions from the academic world are not homogeneous even regarding 
mandatory CSR disclosure. Critics of sustainability disclosure regulations argue that companies 
that are “forced” to increase disclosure will bear significant costs either because of the 
disclosure per se or because of the changes in managerial practices that they will be forced to 
make, thus destroying shareholder value. In contrast, supporters of mandatory CSR disclosure 
argue that firms that increase disclosure will benefit in terms of enhanced corporate reputation 
and superior brand value, recruitment and retention of employee talent, uncovering of 
opportunities to improve process efficiency and management of hidden risks, better access to 
finance, among multiple other reasons (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2017). 
 
Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) conducted a research on data collected from four countries 
(China, Denmark, Malaysia, and South Africa) that had mandated sustainability disclosures 
prior to 2011. This was the first attempt to investigate the effect of disclosure regulations that 
mandate sustainability reporting on firms’ disclosure practices. Their objective was to 
understand whether firms subject to sustainability disclosure mandate had increased ESG 
disclosure following their respective regulation. The research was carried out through a 
differences-in-differences analysis to estimate the impact of the regulation on treated firms, 
using two alternative control groups from the rest of the world. The data was collected from 
Bloomberg, that calculates an ESG Disclosure score and its three sub-scores (Environmental 
(E), Social (S) and Governance (G)) to quantify a company’s transparency in reporting ESG 
information. By applying the criteria that each respective regulation stated, Ioannou and 
Serafeim identified 144 Chinese, 29 Danish, 43 Malaysian, and 101 South African treated firms, 
which are among the largest firms in each of their respective economies. They used two 
different samples to control for other inter-temporal changes in ESG disclosure: a global set of 
control firms and a group of U.S. firms only. The second control group is the most appropriate 
since, compared to other countries, in the U.S. relatively fewer ESG-related disclosure 
regulations have been adopted between 2005 and 2012.  
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With an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model they estimate the effect of the disclosure 
regulations on ESG reporting through the employment of the explaining dummy variable 
Treatmenti x Mandatet. Mandatet is an indicator variable capturing whether in year t the 
regulation mandates disclosure of ESG information and zero otherwise, whereas Treatmenti 
takes the value of one if firm i is covered by the regulation and zero otherwise. Furthermore, 
they control for key time-varying firm characteristics that are likely to be correlated with 
disclosure levels: firm size and leverage.  
The result is a positive coefficient of the Treatmenti x Mandatet variable, therefore consistent 
with an increase in disclosure following the regulation. This finding indicates that treated firms 
had significantly increased ESG disclosure following the regulation, relative to the worldwide 
control group, with efforts to improve the comparability and credibility of the disclosed 
information.  
What emerges from this study is among the most positive aspects and effects of CSR. On the 
other hand, other researchers have investigated different mandates regarding the CSR matter, 
not necessarily obtaining similar positive results. Especially in the last decade, in fact, there 
have been a few countries that have contradicted the traditional CSR definition, exclusively 
focused on the voluntary nature of CSR, to regulate one of the different Corporate Social 
Responsibility aspects. 
In the next paragraphs I will briefly analyze some other interesting cases of CSR regulations 
adopted by various countries from all around the world, together with reviewing studies that 
analyse their positive or negative effects, on the companies concerned.   
 
1.3 Indian Case: Mandatory CSR Expenditures, CSR committee and Shareholder Value. 
India represents one of the strongest examples of recent integration between mandatory and 
voluntary CSR dimensions. For the first time in the world a legislative mandate is forcing a set 
of targeted firms to spend funds on certain forms of Corporate Social Responsibility activities 
(Manchiraju and Rajgopal, 2017). Clause 135 of the Companies Act (2013) requires a firm, 
which meets any threshold of 5 bln Rupees net worth, 10 bln Rupees turnover or 50 mln net 
profit on any fiscal year, to spend 2% of its average net profits of the prior three years on CSR 
activities. Those firms are also required to constitute a Corporate Social Responsibility 
Committee that is in charge of formulating and recommending to the Board a Corporate Social 
Responsibility Policy, including the activities to be undertaken by the company and the amount 
of expenditure to be incurred on them. 
Section 135 is supplemented by two additional sets of provisions: the first one is Schedule VII, 
an appendix to the CA which lists desirable CSR activities. The second one consists in the 
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Corporate Social Responsibility Policy Rules 2014, adopted subsequently by the Minister of 
Corporate Affairs and included in the CA Section 469. The CSR Rules delineate the categories 
of companies subject to Section 135, the modalities of implementation of the CSR activities, 
and the composition of the CSR committee.  
The ratio legis of this unique provision, which went into effect on April 1, 2014, is to fight 
growing income inequality in the Indian liberalized economy and to ensure a better distribution 
of wealth in the communities in which firms operate. Indeed the legislature strongly 
recommends that companies assign priority to projects that have a local impact. However, 
Section 135 is deemed a so called lex imperfecta, as the CA does not prescribe any penalties 
for a company that fails to spend the required amount on CSR activities (Gatti et al., 2018). 
Given its nature of comply-or-explain duty, the only obligation for a firm violating Section 135 
is to specify in the board’s annual report the reasons for not having respected the threshold of 
CSR expenditures.  
The introduction of such a peculiar law addressing Indian companies is attributable to the 
country’s critical social and environmental context. The World Bank Report (2009) states that 
the “below poverty line” ratio in India is still significant, with 26% of people living in urban 
areas and 28% in rural regions surviving below the poverty line. Other alarming data regard the 
maternal and infant mortality rate, as well as a too low literacy rate. This explains why, in the 
last decades, Indian CSR has moved from a philanthropic form of business donations and 
contributions to a more structured practice addressing the urgent developmental challenges of 
the country (Balasubramanian et al., 2005). 
Although this law is completely legitimate and justifiable for what concerns its final purpose, 
it’s still not clear whether this imposition represents a benefit or a loss for the targeted 
companies. Existing empirical evidence on whether CSR investments create shareholder value 
is inconclusive, partly because many studies related to different countries CSR are clouded by 
methodological concerns such as potential endogeneity, reverse causality, or omitted variable 
problems (Margolis et al., 2009). Before the introduction of Section 135 CA, in fact, the choice 
to conduct CSR activities had always been fully voluntary. Thus, reverse causality could drive 
the research results: as highlighted by Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman (2012), firms that are 
doing well, and are hence less financially constrained, are more likely to spend resources on 
CSR activities. Hence, firm performance could cause higher future CSR, as opposed to the other 
way around. 
To partially overcome the inferential problems of previous studies, H. Manchiraju and S. 
Rajgopal (2017) applied their research to the unique regulatory framework of the Indian 
Companies Act 2013 to test whether the mandated CSR expenditure had affected Indian firms’ 
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shareholder value in a positive or negative way. This allowed them to exploit numerical 
thresholds specified in the mandatory CSR rule by employing a Regression Discontinuity 
Design (RDD). The discontinuous threshold is represented by the profit threshold of INR 50 
million, exogenously determined by the CA. Such discontinuity classifies firms as AFFECTED 
those who report a profit just above INR 50 million and are required to comply with CSR rule; 
conversely, UNAFFECTED firms are those who are not required to comply with CSR rule 
having a profit just below the threshold. Intuitively, there is no reason to expect systematic 
differences in a firm with a net income of INR 51 million and another with a net income of INR 
49 million. Accordingly, any difference in firm value, measured around eight important event 
dates underlying the legislative passage of the mandatory CSR rule, between affected and 
unaffected firms could be reasonably attributed to the CSR rule.  
Ex ante, it is difficult to predict the impact of the mandatory CSR rule on shareholder value. In 
situations where firms’ CSR activities are not aligned with their shareholder’s interests, the new 
mandatory CSR rule will likely force firms to redirect their CSR spending to maximize firm 
value, leading thus to an increase in the shareholder value of firms affected by the rule (Cheng 
et al., 2013). However, if firms already conduct CSR to maximize their firm value before the 
law was passed, imposing binding legal constraints on their CSR choices will lead to declines 
in their shareholder values (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  
To capture the effect of the CSR rule on firm value, Manchiraju and Rajgopal compare the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Affected and Unaffected firms around the eight event dates 
that represent major milestones in the legislative passage of the Act; the return on CNX 500 
index is used as a proxy for market return.  The main explaining variable is a dummy capturing 
the overall differential market reaction for the Affected firms relative to Unaffected firms on a 
certain event date. The regression model includes several control variables: other than firm size, 
book-to-market ratio and leverage, commonly employed in other studies related to the CSR 
matter, two variables related to the audit quality and board independence are included. 
Moreover, an element of originality is represented by a dummy variable indicating whether a 
firm belongs to a heavily polluting industry or not, considering the industries identified as such 
by the Ministry of Environment and Forests.  
The study found that, on average, firms that were forced to spend money on CSR experienced 
a 4.1% drop in the stock price around the eight events. In particular, given that firms are required 
to spend 2% of their profits on CSR, the passage of this rule is resulting in a 2% decline in 
shareholder value, corresponding directly to cash outflows of CSR activities, to the extent CSR-
related activities are negative NPV projects. 
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Manchiraju and Rajgopal’s study results suggest that, on average, the mandatory CSR rule has 
imposed significant net costs on affected firms’ shareholders. Furthermore, these results  can 
be attributed the interpretation that giving the firm flexibility to define what CSR means and 
letting it choose where it wants to direct its CSR spending is preferable from the shareholder’s 
perspective. Their findings also indicate that firms, left to their own devices, choose their 
optimal level of CSR spending designed to maximize their firm value. 
 
1.4 Mandatory CSR Assurance Practices in South Africa. 
King III introduced in 2009 the South African Assurance Practices with the King Code of 
Governance for South Africa. One of the Code’s principles requires adopting organisations to 
provide independent assurance on their CSR disclosures. This law, more than the Indian one, 
constitutes an example of integration between mandatory and voluntary CSR dimensions: King 
III originally introduced the entire governance code in a voluntary adoption sense. The 
Johannesburg stock exchange (JSE) regulations, right after, required all JSE-listed companies 
to apply the King III principles. It has accordingly become a de facto mandatory requirement 
for all JSE-listed companies, albeit on an “apply or explain” basis. Such regulatory requirement 
has made South Africa one of the first countries that require certain companies to not only 
disclose their CSR-related performance, but also to provide independent assurance thereon 
(Ackers and Eccles, 2015). 
The institutionalisation of CSR assurance practices in South Africa was driven by the previous 
inconsistent application of voluntary CSR assurance practices, with the consequence of 
impairing the ability of stakeholders to understand the nature and scope of CSR assurance 
engagements. King III has introduced a principle-based voluntary code of conduct, advocating 
an “apply or explain” approach, with the aim of acknowledging and pointing out to African 
companies that “planet, people and profit are inextricably intertwined” (IoD, 2009).  
Stakeholders’ trust in corporate disclosures, and therefore in the company itself, is enhanced 
when companies issue transparent CSR reports and provide users with relevant, accurate, 
reliable and credible information (Marx and van Dyk, 2011). In general, a decade ago non-
financial information was still perceived as less credible than statutory financial information, 
as the former was usually subject to independent verification, whereas the latter is usually not 
(Gouws and Cronjé, 2008). Thereby, it’s not surprising that, without appropriate legislation and 
regulations regarding CSR reporting, many South African organisations were voluntarily 
adopting the principles of the various iterations of the King Code of Governance to improve 
their governance practices and demonstrate their increased accountability (Marx and van Dyk, 
2011). This behaviour can be considered as an attempt to compensate for the lack of universally 
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agreed standards and frameworks, which represent the premise for CSR disclosure all around 
the world.  
Similarly to the other typologies of CSR mandates, the success and appropriateness of King III 
and JSE principle on assurance practices is not that obvious but, on the contrary, it may be 
argued that successful voluntary governance initiatives are not based on an enforcement regime, 
but rather on embedding self-regulation in the corporate fabric. In 2015 Ackers and Eccles 
carried out a longitudinal study to test the effectiveness of the mandate introduced by the 
Johannesburg stock exchange on King III’s principle application. The study examined the CSR 
assurance reports for 2007/2008 (before King III) and 2010/2011 (after King III) published by 
JSE-listed companies. In order to understand the impact of King III on South African CSR 
assurance practices, the CSR assurance reports for 2011/2012 were examined. The empirical 
component of this exploratory study was conducted in two phases. The first phase examined 
the annual/CSR reports of the selected companies to establish the extent of CSR assurance 
provided. In order to identify the CSR assurance providers and to understand emerging 
assurance practices with their implications, the second phase involved a content analysis of the 
identified CSR assurance reports (Babbie and Mouton, 2011). 
A consistent growth in CSR assurance emerged across the study period, clearly illustrating the 
greater impact of King III on larger companies affected by the mandate. Moreover, the study 
revealed that larger companies were already providing independent assurance on their CSR 
disclosures prior to King III, illustrating that larger companies are more likely to have their 
CSR disclosures independently assured than smaller companies. On the other hand, despite the 
“apply or explain” requirement of King III, in the annual/CSR reports several companies did 
not disclose reasons for not providing independently assurance of their CSR disclosures. 
Another important result of this study was that, despite the remarkable increase in the level of 
assurance on African companies’ CSR reports, the layout and structure of the reports for CSR 
assurance engagements reflect significant variation. There are even differences in the assurance 
reports issued by the same assurance provider. The lack of a clearly defined and 
standardised approach for CSR assurance therefore compromises the ability of CSR and CSR 
assurance report users to establish exactly what has been assured, and the extent of confidence 
that may be placed on the underlying CSR disclosures. 
 
1.5 Indonesian 2007 Corporate Law N. 40: Application Problems. 
The 2007 Indonesian Law No. 40, together with 2007 Indonesian Investment Law No. 25, is an 
interesting case of CSR regulatory framework that has created significant debate over the 
voluntary vs. mandatory nature of these two Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure 
  Elisa Conflitti 
15 
 
initiatives. The contradictions between the two laws generated a significant legal uncertainty 
among Indonesian corporations. Under Article 15 of the 2007 Investment Law No.25, every 
corporation is obliged to implement corporate social and environmental responsibility. 
In contrast, Article 74 of the 2007 Limited Liability Corporation Law No. 40 only requires 
companies conducting their business activities in and correlated to the field of natural resources 
to make CSR investments, elucidated as ‘‘the obligation of the company which is budgeted and 
calculated as the cost of the Company.’’ In other words, the obligation for the company consists 
in spending a mandatory amount for implementing CSR which can be accounted for as a 
corporate cost. Sanctions can be imposed for failure to comply with such an obligation 
differently from the 2007 Investment Law No.25, which does not impose any sanction. A 
further difference from Investment Law No. 25 is that the adoption of Article 74 of the 2007 
Corporate Law No. 40 has provoked strong reactions especially due to the presence of two 
opposing groups of actors with contrasting interests. While civil society is primarily concerned 
with the implementation of such regulation, the business community (shareholders, investors, 
analysts, etc,) is more concerned with their impact on corporate costs and their competitive 
disadvantages. 
The Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) and several corporations, representing the 
business interests, even questioned the constitutionality of Law No. 40 before the Constitutional 
Court. Their arguments were that Article 74 creates legal uncertainty as it is not in accordance 
with the CSR movement’s voluntary emphasis; it is unjust and discriminatory, particularly 
toward certain corporations to whom it’s imposing an additional burden, and for this reason 
will negatively impact the economic situation, in general. The Court, instead, ruled in April 
2009 that Article 74 is correct, non-discriminatory and just, holding that CSR is a flexible 
concept which is subject to the interpretation of each country. The Judges also argued that 
Article 74 does not discriminate against particular corporations, as it is based on the potential 
risks posed by corporate behaviour to natural resources. Thus, according to them, it is logical 
for those parties impacting natural resources to be the ones to bear the burden. 
Explicit CSR policies relying on voluntary corporate engagement or acknowledgment in 
Indonesia was still in its early stages when the CSR Law entered into force (Uriarte, 2008). 
Primarily only multinational or large corporations had promoted the adoption of CSR policies, 
which mostly derived from their headquarters or pressure from various elements of society, 
whereas for the small or medium corporations CSR was implemented in only a very limited 
sense or still perceived as a ‘‘foreign’’ concept. The sluggish reception of this type of CSR in 
Indonesia is very much the function of two major issues: 1) the lack of knowledge regarding 
CSR, often perceived as a western concept associated with philanthropic acts, cause-related 
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marketing, or public relations; 2) the general misperception that CSR represents a net cost, as 
opposed to an investment. What’s more, poor legal enforcement, corruption, and excessive 
overlap among different laws have been problems common to all sectors, giving as a result legal 
uncertainties regarding substance, additional administrative costs, and bureaucracy. Hence, 
there is a real need for continuous efforts to educate and train business leaders, employees and 
other stakeholders, including government and NGOs, to make larger commitments (Waagstein, 
2010). 
The mandatory nature of Law No. 40 is one way of ensuring that there is no free ride for 
corporations (Priyono, 2007). Moreover, mandatory CSR can be a complement, not a 
replacement, to other remedial mechanisms. The Indonesian case is once more supporting the 
theory according to which, although CSR was originally intended to be voluntary, it develops 
in a particular country depending  on the special characteristics of that country, thus admitting 
the possibility of imposing mandatory responsibility.  
 
1.6 Mandatory CSR Disclosure in China. 
The Chinese regulation enacted in 2008 ties up the mandatory CSR disclosure subject, 
discussed so much in recent years. Ioannou and Serafeim (2017), in their previously cited 
article, reported positive results after questioning whether mandatory sustainability reporting 
regulations increase firms’ CSR disclosure. Chen, Hung and Wang (2018), in turn, assess the 
impact of the CSR mandate on social externalities, specifically focusing on environmental 
pollution. Although this mandate did not require any changes in firm behavior, they posit that 
mandatory disclosure impacts a firm’s activities because the increased transparency can make 
it easier for governments and interest groups to pressure firms to engage in more CSR activities. 
The mandatory disclosure was introduced in December 2008 by both the SSE (Shanghai Stock 
Exchange) and the SZSE (Shenzhen Stock Exchange) for a subset of firms listed on their 
respective exchanges, to ensure transparency of firms about their CSR. Therefore, the study 
sample was drawn from firms listed on the key stock exchange indices, hence very large firms.  
The general environmental pollution is represented by the sum of two variables: industrial 
wastewater discharge, measuring water pollution, and SO2 emission that measures air pollution. 
The explaining variable of interest in the regression model is the interaction term between a  dummy 
variable indicating whether the period is post-period and another dummy variable indicating 
whether the city is “most impacted” by the disclosure mandate. What emerges is that the most 
impacted cities experience a greater decrease in industrial wastewater and SO2 emission 
subsequent to the mandate. 
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In opposition to the positive results above, the same research further reveals a definitely lower 
advantage for shareholders from the imposition of CSR disclosure. Chen, Hung and Wang 
(2018) investigated the effects of the CSR mandate in terms of improvement or deterioration of 
firm profitability, measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The 
assumption is that, as firms would have undertaken such activity before the mandate if it were 
beneficial to performance, this increase in CSR activity had come at a cost to performance. A 
DiD research design was employed in order to compare changes in firm profitability among 
treatment firms with changes in firm profitability among benchmark firms during the period 
2006-2011. Using ROA allows to make inferences regarding firm performance independent of 
leverage, while using ROE allows to make more comparable inferences regarding shareholder 
wealth. ROA and ROE are regressed on a dummy variable indicating whether the period is 
post-period, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a mandatory CSR reporting firm, 
and their interaction term.  
This second regression results are not as optimistic as for the previous ones concerning the 
mandate effects on the environment: the negative coefficient on the interaction term is 
suggesting that firms subject to mandatory CSR reporting experience a decrease in profitability 
subsequent to the disclosure shock. This change is also economically significant, with ROA and 
ROE decreasing by 26% and 20% respectively. Chen, Hung and Wang interpreted these results 
as evidence that firms respond to the mandate by shutting down some production facilities and 
increasing their spending on pollution control and the labor force, as reflected in the higher 
operating costs. 
In sum, their findings are consistent with the notion that mandatory CSR disclosure changes 
firm behavior and generates positive externalities to society at the expense of shareholders.  
 
The Chinese context was also exploited by Wang, Cao and Ye (2018) as a quasi-natural 
experiment, in order to study the CSR reporting mandate from a completely different 
perspective: they assessed the impact of mandatory CSR reporting on financial reporting 
quality, in particular questioning whether firms subject to the regulatory CSR disclosure are 
less likely to engage in earnings management. Investigating the impact of CSR disclosure on 
earnings management improves the general understanding about the role of CSR disclosure on 
capital markets. Indeed, managers with different motives for financial reporting may disclose 
CSR information strategically. For instance, managers may use voluntary CSR reporting either 
to signal the reliability and veracity of their financial information, leading to a negative relation 
between CSR and earnings management, or to camouflage their earnings-management 
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activities, resulting in a seemingly positive association between CSR and earnings management 
(Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004).  
The analysis was performed over a sample of 1888 firms listed on China’s stock exchanges 
between 2003 and 2012, given the 2008 mandate for a subset of Chinese listed firms to issue 
CSR reports along with their annual reports. The findings illustrate that the absolute 
discretionary accruals of the mandatory CSR reporting firms are significantly lower than those 
of the non-CSR reporting firms after the disclosure regulation. Such an improvement in the 
financial reporting quality is due to a reduction of the information asymmetry between firm 
managers and the public. CSR reporting, in fact, tends to increase the firms’ exposure to public 
attention: when more investor and media attentions are drawn toward the firm, any misbehavior 
of the managers is more likely to be detected and punished. Consistent with the arguments, the 
study found that the mandatory disclosure effect was more pronounced among firms with worse 
information environments, that’s to say firms with lower analyst coverage. 
Further analyses revealed that upward earnings management by mandatory CSR firms is more 
likely to be caught after the policy. These results together confirm that mandatory CSR 
reporting reduces information asymmetry between managers and investors (regulators), 
increases the probability of detection, and therefore deters firms’ earnings management 
activities.  
 
1.7 Directive 2014/95/EU and the European Context. 
In 2014, the European Union (EU) passed a corporate social responsibility (CSR) directive that 
mandates large firms listed on EU stock exchanges to prepare comprehensive non-financial 
reports on CSR. This directive lays down the rules on disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by large public-interest companies with more than 500 employees. This companies 
target covers approximately 6,000 large companies and groups across the EU, including listed 
companies, banks, insurance companies and other companies designated by national authorities 
as public-interest entities.  
Starting from the last fiscal year 2018 onwards, companies considered large, according to their 
number of employees, have to publish reports on the CSR policies they implement as part of 
their annual reports. The European Parliament and Council have broadly indicated in the 
Directive 2014/95/EU that, from a quantitative point of view, the reported information must be 
“to the extent necessary for an understanding of the group's development, performance, position 
and impact of its activity”. But, at the same time, they have fixed a minimum content for the 
companies’ non-financial reports, represented by the areas of main concern, that’s to say 
“environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and 
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bribery matters”. The EC also specifies that such statement should include a description of the 
policies, outcomes and risks related to those matters and should be included in the management 
report of the undertaking concerned. 
One of the major objectives of this directive is to ensure a certain level of uniformity and 
comparability of CSR disclosures among the largest companies all around Europe, together 
with emphasizing the relevance of CSR activities for the businesses belonging to every industry. 
A EU Directive as such has also the peculiarity of not imposing its content directly to the 
targeted companies; it instead lets each single Member State enforce those rules in the way 
deemed the most appropriate to the country’s legal, social and institutional framework.  
Indeed, the EU only specified in the directive text that by December 2016 the Member States 
would have to “bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary 
to comply with this Directive”. A great level of flexibility is also left to EU companies for what 
regards the way of reporting information on their policies, main risks, and outcomes related to 
environmental and social matters. In June 2017 the European Commission published 
its guidelines to help companies disclose environmental and social information, but they are not 
mandatory and companies may decide to use international, European or national guidelines 
according to their own characteristics or business environment.  
Although this directive is a legal requirement, there is no sanction for non-compliance and CSR 
reports will be audited but not verified. For this reason, it has been included in the “soft–hard 
law category”, representing those mandatory standards (hard law) characterized by a low level 
of formalization and weak sanctions (Gatti et al., 2018). 
The 2014 Directive is situated in a European context where CSR had already started playing an 
important role at the end of the 19th century. The European Union, in fact, has been the continent 
that first became a convert to the CSR movement (Mullerat, 2013), where this movement is 
identifying the last two decades growing trend involving the more advanced economies which 
have increased their efforts to promote responsible business practices. Among the main reasons 
for the EU primacy, the presence of more CSR consistent values, norms and perceptions than 
in other areas of the world, jointly with European corporations’ tendency to hold stronger and 
broader approaches to stakeholder relations. In 2000, during the Lisbon Summit, the EU heads 
of state openly made the commitment to: “make Europe the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more 
and better jobs and greater social cohesion by 2010”.  
However, before 2011, the EC wanted CSR in Europe to remain a voluntary initiative for 
European business to practice. This idea appears evident in the EC’s earlier definition, adopted 
in 2001, that called for companies to integrate “social and environmental concerns in their 
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business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.” While 
the EC had taken a position of rejecting regulation and putting the emphasis on voluntary 
measures for business, the European Parliament, together with NGOs and trade unions, had 
been demanding mandatory regulation and reporting of corporations’ social and environmental 
impacts and transparency. Indeed, in 2002 the European Parliament was already voting for a 
new legislation to require companies to publicly report annually on their social and 
environmental performance, to make board members personally responsible for these practices 
and to establish legal jurisdiction against European companies’ abuses in developing countries.  
The European Corporate Social Responsibility scenario changed when, in 2011, the EC 
published a renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for CSR to support entrepreneurship and responsible 
business. The new policy stated that, to meet their social responsibility, enterprises “should 
have in place a process to integrate social, environmental, and ethical and human rights 
concerns into their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their 
stakeholders”. The 2011 policy enhanced the visibility of CSR and the relevance of good 
sustainability practices to spread over all the EU companies.  Moreover, it confirmed the EC’s 
intention to bring forward a new legislative proposal on this issue. The first European legislative 
measure regarding CSR would later be enforced for the first time in 2014, amending the 
Directive 2013/34/EU, entitled “Single Market Act”: this previous directive aimed at ensuring 
the clarity and comparability of financial statements, other than international financial reporting 
standards (IFRS), limiting administrative burdens and providing for simple and robust 
accounting rules, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It was only with 
the European Directive 95, however, that non-financial information began to play a non-
marginal role in the annual reports of, at least, larger European companies.  
 
It’s totally plausible that European companies affected by the CSR regulation have been 
compliant from the very first year of application, possibly increasing their CSR disclosure as 
Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) empirically proved in a similar scenario where an Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) disclosure regulation had been imposed to a certain subgroup of 
firms.  
In a similar way, Wang et al. (2018), regarding the Chinese Context, have highlighted that the 
increase of reported non-financial information, in turn, raised firms’ exposure to public 
attention, therefore producing a reduction of information asymmetry between firms’ managers 
and the public. Empirical evidence regarding the Chinese CSR disclosure regulatory framework 
also shows that, through mechanisms that involve certain firm’s stakeholders, the obligation to 
report a firm CSR performance can positively impact a firm’s own CSR performance. In 
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particular, Chen, Hung and Wang (2018) have statistically proved that the Chinese 2008 CSR 
disclosure mandate had positive diminishing effects on the environmental pollution. Their 
deduction is that, although such a mandate does not require any changes in firm behavior, a 
mandatory disclosure impacts a firm’s activities because the increased transparency can make 
it easier for governments and interest groups to pressure firms to engage in more CSR activities.  
Nevertheless, the literature investigating the relation between mandatory CSR disclosure and 
firm CSR performance is not wide enough to confidently confirm the positive effect found out 
with respect to the Chinese regulatory framework, especially considering that the 2018 study 
(Chen et al.) only focused on environmental performance. Up to now, different types of CSR 
regulations have been mostly investigated from a shareholders’ perspective, with results that in 
most of the cases claim a consequential loss in shareholder value, for example in terms of a 
stock price drop (Manchiraju and Rajgopal, 2017) or measured by a reduction in firm ROA and 
ROE (Chen et al., 2018).  However, when dealing with the implementation of CSR activities, 
the firm profitability cannot be the main focus: as Freeman affirms (2004), firms should go 
beyond merely maximizing stockholder value to address the corporate sustainability objective 
in which other stakeholders are interested.  
This study research question raised to find an answer on whether the European Directive 95 is 
achieving, other than the EU companies’ transparency, also the objective of CSR performance 
enhancement. Such findings are mostly relevant for countries policy makers in order to take 
reasonable decisions on the imposition of CSR disclosure to national companies, after an 
extensive analysis of different types of consequences, not only from an economic standpoint.  
Summarizing all the findings and assumptions discussed above, I can formulate the following 
Research Question: 
RQ1: Did Directive 2014/95/EU positively affect targeted firms’ CSR performance? 
 
2. European CSR Disclosure Regulation and CSR Performance 
 
2.1 Sample, data sources and Regression Model.  
The introduction and the even more recent application of such EU Directive has represented a 
great change in the CSR practices of large European companies. As shown in different articles 
reported in the previous chapter of this work, the introduction of mandatory CSR disclosure can 
potentially bring a great variety of consequences. I will exploit the European regulatory change 
to investigate one specific effect of the 2014 Directive which, according to my research, has 
not been explored yet. The research question of my study is whether the firms obliged by law 
to report on their CSR activities have increased their CSR performance. At the moment, the 
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CSR reporting mandate has affected the targeted subgroup of European companies only in fiscal 
year 2018. Therefore, my research covers only one year of Directive application (2018) and the 
two years before (2016-2017), in order to test whether the mandate has determined a significant 
change in the CSR reported by firms. In the firms sample I solely included companies listed in 
a EU stock exchange and exceeding the objective threshold of 500 employees, which 
determines the applicability of the Directive 2014/95/EU. I selected all firms belonging to the 
S&P Europe 350 Index: it is composed by 350 leading blue-chip companies drawn from 16 
developed European markets that, if only for their size and their financial soundness, can be 
considered public-interest entities. During the extraction of all the needed data from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon database, I made a further skimming on the basis of data availability, ending up 
with a sample made of 317 companies, differentiated by 18 industries. Table 1. below reports 
the Stata Frequency Table of the different industries (ind1) in which the sample has been 
categorized. The column Freq. shows the number of observations falling in each industry 
category, while the column Percent shows the frequency of each industry in percentage terms.  
 
Table 1. Industries frequency for the total 951 observations, obtained from the sample’s 317 companies 
multiplied by 3 years of analysis (2016-2018).  
 
 
As mentioned before, the final objective of the Directive is to increase European companies’ 
transparency and performance on environmental and social matters, thus effectively 
contributing to long-term economic growth and employment. To answer the research question 
about the regulation effect on firm Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) performance, 
I have built an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model, whose dependent variable 
needs to be a measure of European companies ESG performance. For this purpose I have 
selected some Thomson Reuters Eikon ESG Scores, which were employed in other reliable 
                                  Total          951      100.00
                                                                            
                              UTILITIES           51        5.36      100.00
                         TRANSPORTATION           30        3.15       94.64
                     TELECOMMUNICATIONS           42        4.42       91.48
                             TECHNOLOGY           45        4.73       87.07
                              RETAILERS           42        4.42       82.33
                        PHARMACEUTICALS           33        3.47       77.92
PERSONAL & HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTS & SERVICE            9        0.95       74.45
                      MINERAL RESOURCES           27        2.84       73.50
                            INDUSTRIALS          162       17.03       70.66
                             HEALTHCARE           24        2.52       53.63
                       FOOD & BEVERAGES           51        5.36       51.10
                              FINANCIAL          198       20.82       45.74
                                 ENERGY           36        3.79       24.92
             CYCLICAL CONSUMER SERVICES           39        4.10       21.14
             CYCLICAL CONSUMER PRODUCTS           54        5.68       17.03
                              CHEMICALS           54        5.68       11.36
                        BASIC MATERIALS           18        1.89        5.68
             AUTOMOBILES AND AUTO PARTS           36        3.79        3.79
                                                                            
                                   ind1        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
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studies as a measure of companies’ Environmental, Social and Governance Performance (i.e. 
Garcia et al., 2017; Duque-Grisales and Aguilera-Caracuel, 2019).  
Eikon ESG Scores measure a company’s relative ESG performance, commitment and 
effectiveness across 10 main themes (emissions, environmental product innovation, human 
rights, shareholders, etc.) based on company-reported data (Thomson Reuters ESG scores, 
2018). Their characteristic of being based on information reported by the companies 
themselves, however, represents a limitation of these ESG scores which may even lead someone 
to contest their appropriateness for measuring firm ESG performance. Nevertheless, the reason 
why other reliable studies have used them, as aforementioned, is the lack of multiple alternative 
measures of ESG performance. Moreover, they can be considered a robust, data driven 
assessment of companies’ ESG performance and capacity where company size and 
transparency biases are minimal, thanks to one of the largest ESG content collection operations 
in the world (Thomson Reuters EIKON, 2018).  
The first regression dependent variable is the ESG Combined Score, which represents a 
comprehensive scoring of a company’s ESG performance based on the reported information in 
the ESG pillars, with ESG controversies overlay captured from global media sources. Appendix 
1 reports 10 categories in which the ESG pillars are divided and the specific weight attributed 
to each category in order to get company’s ESG Combined Score.  
In the regression model the explaining variable of main interest consists in the dummy variable 
eudir, assuming value equal to 1 if the targeted companies were subject to the application of 
the CSR disclosure mandate in a certain fiscal year, equal to 0 if  not. This variable is built to 
capture whether the beginning of the Directive application has determined a significant change 
in the ESG performance of the sample firms.   
In addition, a number of control variables has been included in the regression, for limiting 
problems related to endogeneity and omitted variables. I have chosen these variables on the 
basis of previous studies related to similar CSR research questions, exclusively classified as 
high-ranking articles either on the Budget Integrato Ricerca Dipartimentale (BIRD) 2018, by 
the Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali “Marco Fanno”, or on the Academic 
Journal Guide 2018, by Chartered Association of Business Schools.  
Table 2 summarizes all the explaining and control variables; each of them is later described in 







Table 2. Regression independent variables. 
Variable Measure  
Dummy for Directive 
2014/95/EU application 
eudir: assumes value of 1 for years in which a company is 
subject to the application Directive 2014/95/EU (2018), 
value of 0 for years before 2018 when the Directive was 




audit: continuous variable assuming values between 0 and 
100. Estimated during each fiscal year by Thomson 
Reuters on the basis of the independence of audit 
committee members, the responsibility of the audit 
committee to select and oversee an issuer’s independent 
accountant and the ability of the audit committee to retain 
outside advisers. 
Return on Assets 
(Thomson Reuters) 
roa: profitability ratio, calculated for each fiscal year as 
end-year income divided by the mean of total assets in 
past 12 months. It's used as an indicator to show how well 




mcap_eq: Market to Book Ratio, in which the numerator 
is calculated as a company’s total of number of shares 
multiplied by their fiscal year close price; the denominator 
is calculated as the company’s number of common shares 
multiplied by their book value.   
Natural logarithm  
of Market Capitalization 
(Market Capitalization from 
Thomson Reuters) 
ln_mcap: firm size indicator, calculated as the natural log 
of the market value of equity, which us a company’s stock 






tdebt_tass: leverage ratio, measuring the amount of total 
assets that are financed by creditors instead of investors. 




cash_ratio: liquidity ratio, calculated as cash and 
marketable securities at the end of year/total current assets 
at the end of year, where the numerator includes 
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instruments that can be converted into cash in three 




capex_tass: a measure of firm capital immobilized in a 
financial year for a medium/long term gain. Calculated as 
capital expenditure during the year/total assets at the end 
of year.  
Dummy indicating Highly 
Polluting Industries 
hpoll_ind: assumes value of 1 if a firm belongs to one 
heavily polluting industries, as defined by Eurostat; 0 if 
not. 
 
The variable audit is the Eikon score Audit Committee Independence, which measures the 
quality of the internal auditing on firms’ non-financial reports. I have chosen Return on Assets 
(ROA) as a firm profitability ratio because firms with better financial performance likely have 
more resources to practice CSR activities and produce better CSR reports. The Market 
Capitalization to Common Equity ratio (mcap_eq) is comparing the value attributed to a firm 
by the market with the book value of its equity. In general, a higher Market to Book ratio is 
considered to be less risky because the firm has less debt, or leverage, and the opposite holds 
true (Manchiraju et al., 2017). The natural logarithm of Market Capitalization (ln_mcap) is a 
control for firm size, because size captures various factors motivating firms to issue CSR reports 
such as public pressure or financial resources. I also included in the model a control variable 
for firm leverage, calculated as total debt over total assets, because debt servicing plays a 
monitoring role and debt holders demand greater disclosure (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). I have taken 
a leaf out of the 2017 empirical study by Manchiraju and Rajgopal to include two more financial 
ratios as control variables: a cash ratio, calculated as Cash & Cash Equivalents/Total Current 
Assets, and a capex ratio, calculated as Capital Expenditure/Total Assets. The cash holdings 
and the capital expenditures of a firm are likely not to change much in the years of observation 
2016-2018 and, in the meanwhile, are likely to affect a firm CSR performance through their 
influence on firm ability to make investments on CSR activities and the related disclosure.  The 
last control variable of my model, hpoll_ind, consists in a dummy variable capturing whether a 
firm belongs to one of the heavily polluting industries defined by Eurostat in its 2010 report 
entitled “Environmental Pressure of Sectors, by NACE code”. The industries defined as such 
consist in the twenty sectors with the greatest aggregated impact per unit of Gross Value Added. 
I have included this variable on the heels of other studies examined in the previous chapter, 
with the expectation that highly polluting firms in general tend to invest more in CSR in order 
to improve the corporate image and reputation in the eyes of their stakeholders.  
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The first OLS regression model specification, altogether, is as follows:  
 
ESG_combi = β1 eudiri + β2 auditi + β3 ROAi + β4 mcap_eqi + β5 ln_mcapi + β6 tdebt_tassi + 
β7 capex_tassi + β8 cash_ratioi + β9 hpoll_indi 
 
Appendix 2 reports the correlation matrix referring to all the explaining and control variables. 
Notwithstanding the validity and the meaningfulness of the ESG Combined Score, I wanted to 
deepen the analysis of the European CSR Directive effects over the CSR performance of 
European companies. Although a combined score can give a general idea about this change, it 
doesn’t represent in-depth the Directive’s impact on each ESG pillar. Therefore, I used all the 
previously described independent variables to be regressed on eight more dependent variables, 
which consist in some of the ESG Combined Score components. I have selected them from 
various variables composing each ESG pillar on EIKON database, according to their relevance 
in the ESG Combined Score and also based on whether they were present for the companies 
sample in the three years of study. Appendix 3 provides an explanation of the 8 ESG Scores 
taken into consideration. 
 
2.2 Results and Model Limitations. 
Prior to the final regressions on Stata, I performed an independent t-test for each dependent 
variable, in order to determine whether they present a statistically significant difference before 
and after Directive 2014/95/EU application.  
Table 3 below shows the test results related to the ESG Combined Score dependent variable.  
A p-value much lower than 0.05 is rejecting the null hypothesis, thus proving that the difference 
between the variable mean values in the first two years and in the last year of observation is 
significant. In other words, the t-test is demonstrating that in years 2016-2017 the ESG 
combined score of the observed companies was, on average, 5.56% higher than in fiscal year 
2018. This output is coherent with and is anticipating the regression results, which will follow 
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Table 3. T-test performed on the dependent variable ESG Combined Score. 
 
 
Among the other dependent variables taken into consideration, only three of them have shown 
a significant mean-difference in their respective t-tests; in particular, two are related to the 
Environmental pillar (Emission Reduction/Innovative Production Score and Emission 
Reduction/CO2 Reduction Score) and one to the Social pillar (Employment 
Quality/Employment Awards Score). For all these three variables, the mean value after the EU 
Directive application is lower than before, which reflects the average change in the overall ESG 
Combined Score. Moreover, a significant mean-variation in only these two pillars is coherent 
with the composition of the ESG Combined Score, in which they play the major role.  
 
The statistical regression results are in contrast with the positive expectations generated by 
going through previous literature regarding CSR disclosure imposed in other countries.  
As stated before, I used an OLS linear model to verify the Hypothesis 1.  
Table 4 below shows the Stata results obtained by regressing the dependent variable ESG 
Combined Score on the independent variable of interest, eudir, and all the control variables. 
 




                                                                              
       _cons     98.35689   10.05256     9.78   0.000     78.57848    118.1353
   hpoll_ind     .4154205   1.507991     0.28   0.783    -2.551551    3.382391
  cash_ratio    -.1421233    .048966    -2.90   0.004    -.2384639   -.0457827
  capex_tass     .3635809   .2240298     1.62   0.106    -.0771976    .8043593
  tdebt_tass    -.0549382   .0442831    -1.24   0.216    -.1420652    .0321888
     ln_mcap    -2.635345   .5506429    -4.79   0.000    -3.718735   -1.551956
     mcap_eq     .0013638    .004082     0.33   0.739    -.0066676    .0093952
         roa     .1446522   .1080797     1.34   0.182    -.0679946    .3572989
       audit     .0662662   .0311557     2.13   0.034     .0049675     .127565
       eudir     -3.23412   .6493255    -4.98   0.000    -4.511668   -1.956572
                                                                              
    esg_comb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
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A negative and statistically significant eudir coefficient is signalling that when the sampled 
companies started reporting their ESG performance because of Directive 2014/95/EU 
imposition, they showed a worse performance, at least in some ESG areas subject of regulation.  
Subsequently, I excluded from the regression model the less significant explaining variables, 
which I identified according to two criteria: their t-test reported in Table 3 and by separately 
regressing the dependent variable on each single independent and control variable. Based on 
these parameters, I excluded the variables ROA, Market Cap/Common Equity, Total Debt/Total 
Assets and the dummy variable Heavily Polluting Industry. However, the results did not change 
much, in terms of both R-squared and significance of the explaining variables.  
 
Afterwards, I made a different adjustment to the regression by eliminating one year of 
observation: 2017. This can be presumably considered as a year of transition, where the targeted 
European companies were already getting prepared to the application of the CSR disclosure 
mandate. The following Table 5 shows whether this assumption makes sense.  
 
Table 5. Stata output: regression of the dependent variable ESG Combined Score, years 2016 
and 2018, excluding 2017.
 
 
We can immediately observe an even more negative effect of the Directive application on the 
ESG Combined Score, given an increase in the R2 of the total model by nearly 0.03 and a clear 
modification in the significance of the explaining variables. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that 2017 is a passage year, therefore the Directive effect on companies’ CSR 
performance will appear smoothed if we include its related observations in the regression. 
However, this “more negative” relationship between the application of the CSR disclosure 
directive and firms’ CSR performance disagrees with our expectations even more than in Table 
3 model.  
Among the regressions performed for the other dependent variables taken into consideration, I 
will only report the results of those showing a statistically significant correlation with the 
                                                                              
       _cons     103.6406   10.53729     9.84   0.000     82.90854    124.3727
   hpoll_ind    -.1287356   1.609214    -0.08   0.936    -3.294864    3.037392
  cash_ratio    -.1400586   .0499911    -2.80   0.005    -.2384161    -.041701
  capex_tass      .227787   .2247242     1.01   0.312    -.2143577    .6699317
  tdebt_tass    -.0244523   .0449649    -0.54   0.587    -.1129207     .064016
     ln_mcap    -3.020837   .5723165    -5.28   0.000     -4.14687   -1.894805
     mcap_eq     .0055321   .1330757     0.04   0.967    -.2562942    .2673584
         roa     .3315187   .0953277     3.48   0.001     .1439615     .519076
       audit     .0788787   .0325911     2.42   0.016     .0147556    .1430018
       eudir    -4.381319   .8136761    -5.38   0.000    -5.982226   -2.780412
                                                                              
    esg_comb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
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dummy variable eudir. Not surprisingly, three of these variables correspond to those presenting, 
in the T-tests reported above, a mean value significantly different before and after the CSR 
mandate application. Only the variable Emission Reduction/Policy score showed a positive 
correlation with my independent variable of interest, though its change following the directive 
application was not very significant. In the following Tables 5 to 8 I have reported the Stata 
results of these variables, related to only two of the ESG pillars, that is to say social and 
environmental.   
Table 6 presents the Stata output of regressing Emission Reduction/Policy score on all the nine 
explaining variables already illustrated above. This EIKON Score, belonging to the 
environmental pillar, is a measure of whether and how a company is implementing a policy for 
reducing environmental emissions or its impacts on biodiversity.  
 
Table 6. Stata output: regression of the dependent variable emission_policy, years of 
observation 2016-2018.  
 
 
The explaining variable eudir has clearly a significant positive effect on emission_policy, 
indicating that, on average, the companies affected by Directive 2014/95/EU increased and/or 
improved their policies aimed at limiting their activities impact on the environment in the last 
financial year with respect to the previous two years 2016-2017. However the t-test performed 
before had shown a limited change in the mean value of this dependent variable from years 
2016-2017 to the year of regulatory application 2018. This explains why the overall positive 
but limited contribution of Emission Reduction/Policy score to ESG combined Score is not 
determinant, thus we observe a negative correlation between esg_comb and eudir in all the 
regression model specifications. 
 
The Stata output reported in the following Table 7 is obtained with a regression model having 
one of the social-pillar-related scores as dependent variable. Employment Quality/ 
                                                                              
       _cons     9.984329   19.73222     0.51   0.613     -28.8388    48.80746
   hpoll_ind     7.840852   2.651206     2.96   0.003     2.624606     13.0571
  cash_ratio    -.0720047   .0781617    -0.92   0.358    -.2257878    .0817784
  capex_tass     .4114373   .3853241     1.07   0.286    -.3466878    1.169562
  tdebt_tass    -.0559684   .0805642    -0.69   0.488    -.2144783    .1025416
     ln_mcap     3.679312   1.047337     3.51   0.001     1.618677    5.739947
     mcap_eq    -.0177557    .015178    -1.17   0.243    -.0476184     .012107
         roa    -.0485461   .0939024    -0.52   0.606     -.233299    .1362069
       audit     .0904003    .058803     1.54   0.125    -.0252947    .2060952
       eudir     1.133449   .1469895     7.71   0.000     .8442473    1.422651
                                                                              
emission_p~y        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
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Employment Awards score is assigned to a company based on whether it has won an award or 
any prize related to general employment quality or “Best company to work for”. 
 




The dependent variable employment_quality has the second highest and most significant 
coefficient of correlation with the dummy eudir, second only after the other dependent variable 
emission_co2, whose regression outcome is reported in Table 8. These two variables belong to 
different ESG pillars, but it’s no coincidence that both of them consist in the only two pillars 
addressed by the European Directive 95. Indeed, the Governance pillar, differently from the 
Social and the Environmental ones, is not part of the minimum requirements of disclosure 
outlined in the regulation. 
 
Table 8 presents the Stata results regarding the regression of Emission Reduction/Innovative 
Production score on the explaining variable eudir and eight control variables. This 
environmental-pillar-related score is indicating the extent to which a company reports on any 
of the following topics: the concentration of production locations in order to limit the 
environmental impact during the production process; the participation in any emission trading 
initiative; any new production technique implemented to improve the global environmental 







                                                                              
       _cons       58.686   17.17982     3.42   0.001     24.88472    92.48728
   hpoll_ind    -2.841664   2.463175    -1.15   0.250     -7.68796    2.004631
  cash_ratio     .0085052    .055651     0.15   0.879    -.1009881    .1179985
  capex_tass    -.0215713   .3768626    -0.06   0.954    -.7630484    .7199058
  tdebt_tass     -.012545   .0719317    -0.17   0.862    -.1540706    .1289805
     ln_mcap     .1247968   .9633613     0.13   0.897    -1.770616     2.02021
     mcap_eq     .0120712   .0058097     2.08   0.039     .0006407    .0235017
         roa     -.136879   .0966793    -1.42   0.158    -.3270954    .0533375
       audit    -.0187702   .0479553    -0.39   0.696    -.1131221    .0755817
       eudir     -11.2561   1.445021    -7.79   0.000    -14.09918   -8.413024
                                                                              
employment~y        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
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The results implicate that even on this dependent variable the European CSR directive 
application had a diminishing effect in the first year of its application, in contrast with the 
expected output of the research model. 
 
Table 9 presents the results of the last ESG-related score for which I found a significant 
correlation with the dummy variable eudir. The variable Emission Reduction/CO2 Reduction 
score measures a company’s initiative to reduce, reuse, recycle, substitute, phase out or 
compensate CO2 equivalents in the production process. 
 




The differing significance level of the various ESG components is further evidence that 
European Directive 95, enacted in 2014, is addressing only two out of three ESG pillars. 
Specifically, the minimum disclosure requirements imposed by the CSR regulation are 
“environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and 
bribery matters”, which refer to the Environmental and Social pillars. In fact, if Eikon database 
does not contain much information and indicators regarding the Governance pillar is because 
                                                                              
       _cons    -34.72559   20.76078    -1.67   0.095    -75.57242    6.121235
   hpoll_ind     18.80468   3.147805     5.97   0.000     12.61138    24.99798
  cash_ratio     .0589705   .0850296     0.69   0.488    -.1083251    .2262661
  capex_tass      1.19471   .4820213     2.48   0.014     .2463329    2.143086
  tdebt_tass    -.0307436   .0903039    -0.34   0.734    -.2084165    .1469292
     ln_mcap     4.276226   1.188809     3.60   0.000     1.937246    6.615207
     mcap_eq     -.032014   .0127324    -2.51   0.012    -.0570651    -.006963
         roa    -.2478818   .1807799    -1.37   0.171    -.6035662    .1078026
       audit     .1383145   .0618565     2.24   0.026     .0166119     .260017
       eudir    -5.841342   1.204503    -4.85   0.000    -8.211202   -3.471482
                                                                              
emission_i~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons    -25.54917    18.0077    -1.42   0.157    -60.97931    9.880976
   hpoll_ind     12.72452   2.730392     4.66   0.000     7.352474    18.09656
  cash_ratio     .0814585   .0763657     1.07   0.287     -.068791    .2317081
  capex_tass     1.114523   .3842097     2.90   0.004     .3585905    1.870455
  tdebt_tass     .0502578   .0826706     0.61   0.544    -.1123965    .2129121
     ln_mcap     4.547002   1.027091     4.43   0.000     2.526202    6.567802
     mcap_eq    -.0384714   .0157654    -2.44   0.015    -.0694897   -.0074531
         roa    -.0987767   .1581041    -0.62   0.533    -.4098463     .212293
       audit     -.004235   .0541509    -0.08   0.938    -.1107768    .1023068
       eudir    -19.23944   1.711383   -11.24   0.000    -22.60659   -15.87229
                                                                              
emission_co2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
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companies didn’t report about that in the last years, including fiscal year 2018. Furthermore 
some specific aspects of these two pillars have been addressed more than others in the first year 
of mandate application.  
 
The overall results are clearly rejecting the initial hypothesis, according to which the application 
of the Directive should have led to an improvement of the CSR performance emerging from 
firms’ annual reports. A plausible explanation to this outcome is that the first year of Directive 
application may represent a transitional year, in which affected companies were shifting their 
investments from the voluntary CSR activities on which they were previously investing to the 
activities relating to the areas which Directive 2014/95/EU obliges them to report about. Such 
a transition requires some time for the re-organization of resources and their deployment for 
newly examined and selected CSR activities.  
Therefore, following the Directive application, firms CSR performance may go down only in 
the short-run, but this does not exclude that replicating the study in the next years may reveal 
positive consequences in terms of CSR performance. Indeed, recalling the 2018 article by Chen, 
Hung and Wang, mandatory CSR disclosure is likely to change firm behavior and to generate 
positive externalities to society thanks to a higher firms’ exposure to public attention and a 
closer monitoring of its Environmental, Social and Governance activities by external 
stakeholders.  
On the other hand, the opposition of my study results to the general expectations could be 
imputed to a statistical confounding problem caused by a regression model misspecification. In 
this case, confounding is attributable to omitted variables and/or to the use of a model which is 
not the most suitable for such a research question. Certainly, more research is needed regarding 
the EU Directive effects, not only with respect to firms’ CSR performance but also to different 
potential consequences of economic or social nature. In order to answer my research question, 
considering a future greater availability of data for the years following the directive application, 
the adoption of a Diff-in-Diff model is recommendable as it would allow to better isolate the 
effect of mandated CSR disclosure from other external factors. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This work investigates the effect of CSR mandatory disclosure on firm CSR performance.  
After examining various cases of CSR regulations mandating some CSR aspect in different 
worldwide countries, I focused on the European CSR context. Specifically, at the centre of my 
analysis I have placed Directive 2014/95/EU, whose application began in the last financial year 
2018. It has imposed to EU public-interest entities with more than 500 employees to publicly 
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disclose information regarding some specific Environmental and Social matters, in a European 
context where CSR had already been playing a relevant role in supporting entrepreneurship and 
responsible business, especially with the renewed EU strategy 2011-14.  
By means of an OLS regression model performed over 3 years 2016-2018, I answered the 
research question on whether the CSR disclosure mandate positively influenced the CSR 
performance of targeted EU companies in its very first year of application 2018.  
The underlying assumption is the compliance of European firms with the Directive from the 
very first year of application, as proved for the Chinese 2008 CSR disclosure mandate (Wang 
et al., 2018) and explained by an increased exposure to public attention, which reduces the 
information asymmetry between firms’ managers and the public.  
Despite the positive expectations raised by the Chinese-regulation-related findings of 
diminishing effects on the environmental pollution (Chen et al., 2018), my statistical analysis 
results overall show that the CSR performance reported by European Companies in fiscal year 
2018 has deteriorated with respect to the years of control 2016 and 2017, with an average 
decrease by 5.56%. After a deeper investigation on the performance of EU companies in 
different ESG areas, I also found that only some components related to the Environmental and 
Social pillar have a significant correlation with the variable representing the Directive 
application. Therefore, the Governance pillar, differently from the other two ESG pillars, did 
not contribute to the identified decrease in firm CSR performance, which is coherent with 
Directive 95 minimum disclosure requirements.  
A plausible explanation to my study results is that the first year of Directive 2014/95/EU 
application may represent a transitional year, in which affected firms were still re-organizing 
their resources in order be able to invest in CSR activities relating to the areas which they are 
obliged to report about. If this was true, an enhanced ESG performance will emerge in the 
medium-long term, which would be consistent with the empirical findings of Chen, Hung and 
Wang (2018). 
At the end, I recognize some limitations of the statistical model used which could generate a 
confounding problem. Thereby, for future research, with the availability of more years data, I 
suggest a strengthening of my study through the use of a Diff-in-Diff model which can 
potentially better isolate the effect of mandated CSR disclosure on CSR performance, thus 






Appendix 1. ESG Score Composition 
The ESG pillars are grouped into 10 categories, reported in the Graph1 below, that are given a 




Thomson Reuters ESG categories. Source: Thomson Reuters ESG scores (2018). 
 
 
Appendix 2. Correlation Matrix of the statistical regression Independent Variables  
The independent variables correlation matrix is reported below with two different layouts, 
corresponding to different Stata commands. Table 10 shows the correlation coefficients for 
every possible combination of explaining variables pair. Table 11 reports only the variables 
correlation coefficients significant at the 5% level.  






   hpoll_ind     0.0015  -0.0434   0.0891  -0.0142  -0.0700   0.0909   0.1803   0.2898   1.0000
  cash_ratio    -0.0114   0.0131   0.1194   0.0124  -0.0604   0.1076   0.3131   1.0000
  capex_tass     0.0048  -0.0381   0.1606   0.0203  -0.0416   0.1198   1.0000
  tdebt_tass     0.0068   0.1142  -0.0481  -0.0174   0.0486   1.0000
     ln_mcap    -0.0219  -0.0971   0.0745  -0.0284   1.0000
     mcap_eq     0.0166  -0.0218   0.0453   1.0000
         roa     0.0007  -0.0148   1.0000
       audit     0.0088   1.0000
       eudir     1.0000
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Appendix 3. Dependent Variables belonging to ESG Combined Score 
The meaning of each dependent variable, representing a component of the ESG Combined 
Score, is reported from Eikon database, as follows: 
SCORE VARIABLE MEANING 
Health & Safety /Policy 
Does the company have a policy to improve 
employee health and safety within the 
company and its supply chain? 
Employment Quality/Employment Awards 
Has the company won an award or any prize 
related to general employment quality or 
“Best company to work for”? 
              
                 0.0000
   hpoll_ind     0.2898   1.0000 
              
              
  cash_ratio     1.0000 
                                
               cash_r~o hpoll_~d
              
                 0.9633   0.1816   0.0059   0.6622   0.0309   0.0050   0.0000
   hpoll_ind     0.0015  -0.0434   0.0891  -0.0142  -0.0700   0.0909   0.1803 
              
                 0.7248   0.6860   0.0002   0.7027   0.0626   0.0009   0.0000
  cash_ratio    -0.0114   0.0131   0.1194   0.0124  -0.0604   0.1076   0.3131 
              
                 0.8830   0.2406   0.0000   0.5320   0.2000   0.0002
  capex_tass     0.0048  -0.0381   0.1606   0.0203  -0.0416   0.1198   1.0000 
              
                 0.8329   0.0004   0.1386   0.5912   0.1344
  tdebt_tass     0.0068   0.1142  -0.0481  -0.0174   0.0486   1.0000 
              
                 0.5003   0.0027   0.0215   0.3810
     ln_mcap    -0.0219  -0.0971   0.0745  -0.0284   1.0000 
              
                 0.6088   0.5023   0.1631
     mcap_eq     0.0166  -0.0218   0.0453   1.0000 
              
                 0.9821   0.6491
         roa     0.0007  -0.0148   1.0000 
              
                 0.7854
       audit     0.0088   1.0000 
              
              
       eudir     1.0000 
                                                                             




Does the company monitor the board 
functions through the establishment of a 
nomination committee?  
Emission Reduction/Policy 
Does the company have a policy for 
reducing environmental emissions or its 
impacts on biodiversity? And does it have a 
policy for maintaining an environmental 
management system? 
Emission Reduction/Innovative Production 
Does the company report on the 
concentration of production locations in 
order to limit the environmental impact 
during the production process? Or does the 
company report on its participation in any 
emission trading initiative? Or does the 
company report on new production 
techniques to improve the global 




All real or estimated penalties, fines from 
lost court cases, settlements or cases not yet 
settled regarding environmental 
controversies in US dollars.  
Emission Reduction/CO2 Reduction 
Does the company show an initiative to 
reduce, reuse, recycle, substitute, phase out 
or compensate CO2 equivalents in the 
production process? 
Emission Reduction/Environment Restore 
Initiative 
Does the company report or provide 
information on company-generated 









 B. Ackers, N. Eccles. Mandatory corporate social responsibility assurance 
practices. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 2015.  
 E. Babbie, J. Mouton. The Practice of Social Research. Oxford University Press Southern 
Africa, 2011.  
 N.K. Balasubramanian, D. Kimber, F. Siemensma. Emerging opportunities or traditions 
reinforced? Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 2005. 
 U. Baxi. Market Fundamentalisms: Business Ethics at the Altar of Human Rights. Human 
Rights Law Review, 2005. 
 C.B. Bhattacharya, L. Xueming. Corporate social responsibility, customer satisfaction and 
market value. Journal of Marketing, 2006. 
 Y.C. Chen, M. Hung, and Y. Wang. The Effect of Mandatory CSR Disclosure on Firm 
Profitability and Social Externalities: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 2018. 
 M. Cominetti, P. Seele. Hard soft law or soft hard law? A content analysis of CSR guidelines 
typologized along hybrid legal status. UWF, 2016. 
 J.J. Cordeiro, M. Tewari. Firm Characteristics, Industry Context, and Investor Reactions 
to Environmental CSR: A Stakeholder Theory Approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 2014. 
 H. Demsetz, K. Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences. 
Journal of Political Economy 93, 1985. 
   D.S. Dhaliwal, O. Z. Li, A. Tsang, Y.G. Yang. Voluntary Nonfinancial Disclosure and the 
Cost of Equity Capital: The Initiation of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting. 
Accounting Review, 2011.  
 E. Duque-Grisales, J. Aguilera-Caracuel. Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
Scores and Financial Performance of Multilatinas: Moderating Effects of Geographic 
International Diversification and Financial Slack. Journal of Business Ethics, 2019.  
 A. Edmans. The link between job satisfaction and firm value, with implications for 
corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management Perspectives, 2012. 
 European Commission. A renewed EU strategy 2011–14 for corporate responsibility. 
Commission of the European Communities, 2011. 
 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 2014/95/EU. 22 October 2014. 
 Eurostat, 2010. November 2010 European Commission – Eurostat Information Hub – 
Environmental Pressure of Sectors, by NACE Code.  
38 
 
 R.E. Freeman. The stakeholder approach revisited. Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts-und 
Unternehmensethik, 2004. 
 A.S. Garcia, W. Mendes-da-Silva and R.J. Orsato. Sensitive industries produce better ESG 
performance: Evidence from emerging markets. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2017. 
 L. Gatti, B.  Vishwanath, P. Seele, B. Cottier. Are We Moving Beyond Voluntary CSR? 
Exploring Theoretical and Managerial Implications of Mandatory CSR Resulting 
from the New Indian Companies Act. Journal of Business Ethics, 2018. 
 D.G. Gouws, C.J. Cronjé. Corporate annual reports: accounting practices in transition. 
Southern African Business Review, 2008.  
 C. Hemingway, P. Maclagan. Managers’ personal values as drivers of corporate social 
responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 2004.  
 H. Hong, J.D. Kubik, J.A. Scheinkman. Financial Constraints on Corporate Goodness, 
2012. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1734164 . 
 B. Horrigan. 21st century corporate social responsibility trends—An emerging comparative 
body of law and regulation oncorporate responsibility, governance, and sustainability. 
Corporate social responsibility in the 21st century. Debates, modelsand practices across 
government law and business, 2007. 
 Institute of Directors (IoD). King Code of Governance for South Africa 2009. LexisNexis, 
Sandton, 2009. 
 I. Ioannou, G. Serafeim. The Consequences of Mandatory Corporate Sustainability 
Reporting. Harvard Business School Research Working Paper No. 11-100, 2017. 
 I. Lock, P. Seele. The credibility of CSR (corporate social responsibility) reports in Europe. 
Evidence from a quantitative content analysis in 11 countries. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 2016. 
 H. Manchiraju, S. Rajgopal. Does Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Create 
Shareholder Value? Evidence from the Indian Companies Act 2013. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 2017.   
 J.D. Margolis, H.A. Elfenbein, J.P. Walsh. Does it Pay to be Good. . . and Does it Matter?. 
A meta-analysis of the relationship between corporate social and financial performance, 
2009. 
 B. Marx, V. van Dyk. Sustainability reporting and assurance: an analysis of assurance 
practices in South Africa. Meditari Accountancy Research, 2011. 
 R.C. Merton. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. 
The Journal of Finance, 1987. 
  Elisa Conflitti 
39 
 
 Ministry of Corporate Affairs. Indian Companies Act 2013. Available at: 
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CompaniesAct2013.pdf. 
 R. Mullerat. Published with the support of the European Commission. Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A European Perspective. Miami-Florida European Union Center of 
Excellence, 2013. 
 B. O’ Neill. Solving the “problem” of free riding. From mises institute, Austrian economics 
freedom and peace webpage, 2007. 
 H. Priyono. CSR – Charity or Democratic Accountability?. The Jakarta Post, 2007.  
 A. Richardson, M. Welker. Social disclosure, financial disclosure and the cost of equity 
capital. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2001. 
 H. Servaes, A. Tamayo. The impact of corporate social responsibility on firm value: The 
role of customer awareness. Management Science, 2013. 
 Thomson Reuters EIKON. Thomson Reuters ESG scores, 2018. Available at: 
http://zeerovery.nl/blogfiles/esg-scores-methodology.pdf . 
 D.A. Uriarte. Corporate Social Responsibility in the ASEAN Region. LCF CSR Conference, 
2008. 
 R. Verrecchia. Essays on Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2011. 
 P.R. Waagstein. The Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia: Problems 
and Implications. Journal of Business Ethics, 2010. 
 X. Wang, F. Cao, K. Ye. Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reporting and 
Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 2018. 
 World Bank Report, 2009. Available at: 
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAR2009/Resources/6223977 
1252950831873/AR09_Complete.pdf . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
